Tragedy at Luzhniki on October 20, 1982- a mass stampede with casualties that occurred at the Grand Sports Arena (BSA) of the Central Stadium named after. V.I. Lenin (now the Luzhniki Stadium) in Moscow at the end of the first match of the 1/16 UEFA Cup between the football clubs Spartak Moscow (USSR) and Haarlem (Netherlands).
66 Spartak fans died in the stampede, many of whom were still teenagers. This stampede became the most tragic incident in the history of Soviet and Russian sports.
Information about the number of victims of this tragedy appeared in the Soviet press only seven years later, in 1989.
On the eve of the match, the first snow fell in Moscow. And the day of the game itself, Wednesday, October 20, 1982, turned out to be unusually frosty (-10°C) for mid-October. Therefore, out of 82,000 tickets for the match, only about 16,500 were sold (according to some sources - 16,643 tickets). In 1982, the stadium was not yet equipped with a roof over the stands. By the start of the game, only two stands were cleared of snow and opened for fans: “C” (eastern) and “A” (western). Both stands seated 23,000 spectators, which was significantly more than the number of tickets sold. During the match, there were only about 4 thousand spectators in stand “A”; the majority of fans (about 12 thousand) preferred stand “C”, which is located closer to the metro. The vast majority of fans came to support Spartak; there were only about a hundred Dutch fans. Two staircases led from each stand to the exits from the stadium, located at different ends of the under-stand corridor.
The match started at 19:00. Already in the 16th minute of the game, Edgar Hess scored the first goal against Haarlem from a free kick. Towards the end of the match, not expecting any more goals, a significant part of the (by that time quite frozen) fans began to leave their seats in the stands and headed for the exits. Most of the fans in Stand C moved to stairs No. 1, which was closer to the metro. Just 20 seconds before the final whistle, Sergei Shvetsov scored the second goal against Haarlem. Around the same time, a stampede began on Staircase No. 1 of Grandstand “C” in the stadium’s sub-tribune space, which led to the death of 66 fans.
Those injured in the crush were taken in ambulances to the emergency room of the Institute of Emergency Medicine named after. Sklifosovsky. The next day, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov visited the institute, where he met with some doctors and relatives of the victims. The bodies of the victims were first transferred to the Lenin monument near the stadium, and then were taken to Moscow morgues and, after a forensic examination and identification, returned to relatives for burial.
The only message about the tragedy was published the next day on the last page of the Vechernyaya Moskva newspaper under the heading “Incident”:
“On October 20, 1982, after a football match at the Grand Sports Arena of the Central Stadium named after V.I. Lenin, when spectators were leaving, as a result of a violation of the order of people’s movement, an accident occurred. There are casualties. An investigation into the circumstances of the incident is underway."
After the tragedy, the newspaper "Soviet Sport" and the weekly "Football-Hockey" published (October 21 and 24) detailed articles about this match (under the titles "Cold Weather - Hot Game" and "Score for Seconds"), but they kept silent about what -or a misfortune that happened to the fans.
The Spartak players learned about the tragedy from their team boss, Nikolai Starostin, the day after the match. According to some recollections, the Voice of America radio station may have reported the incident as early as the evening of October 20. However, the Haarlem players claim that they first learned about what happened only seven years after the tragedy.
After an investigation into the tragedy by investigators from the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office, the case was sent to court. All representatives of the victims were familiarized with the case materials. At an open meeting of the Moscow City Court on February 8, 1983, chaired by Judge V.A. Nikitin, the criminal case was heard. The trial lasted only a day and a half.
The director of the Grand Sports Arena of the stadium was brought to criminal liability. Lenin V. A. Kokryshev and chief commandant Yu. L. Panchikhin. On November 26, an indictment was presented to them and for the remainder of the investigation they were taken into custody in Butyrka prison. Yuri Panchikhin was appointed commandant of the BSA just two and a half months before the tragedy. Viktor Kokryshev was expelled from the ranks of members of the CPSU two days after the tragedy. Kokryshev and Panchikhin were both sentenced by the court to 3 years in prison, which was the maximum punishment under Article 172 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR on liability for negligent performance of their official duties. However, at this time an amnesty was issued in connection with the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. Kokryshev came under amnesty as a person with government awards and was released from punishment. Panchikhin, due to the amnesty, his prison term was reduced by half. He was sent to forced labor in the Moscow region, and then to Kalinin.
Also subject to criminal liability were the deputy director of the BSA, K. V. Lyzhin, and the commander of the police unit that ensured the protection of public order at stand “C,” Major S. M. Koryagin. But due to the illness of both (the first, a WWII veteran, went to the hospital with a heart attack; and the second was seriously injured - the crowd threw him onto the concrete when he tried to stop the blockage), the materials regarding them were allocated to separate proceedings. Later, both also came under amnesty as persons with government awards.
The trial took place at the Builders' Palace of Culture in the Kuntsevo district, near the Molodezhnaya metro station. At the end of the trial, the materials of the criminal case were deposited in the archives of the Moscow City Court.
Although the trial of those responsible for the incident was open, it was not reported in the press. The first publication about the circumstances and victims of this tragedy appeared in the press only six years later, on July 8, 1989, with the advent of the era of glasnost.
In the modern Western press, the Luzhniki tragedy is often compared to the tragedy at the Ibrox stadium in Glasgow (UK), which occurred on January 2, 1971, due to the amazing similarity in some circumstances of these disasters. In both cases, tragedy occurred in the final minutes of the match, when hundreds of spectators began to descend the stairs and at the same time one of them tripped and fell, causing a chain reaction of falls and a subsequent stampede. Also, in both cases, the same number of fans died in the stampede - 66. And, finally, both accidents coincided with an unexpected goal scored in the last seconds of the match.
As the investigation established, two of the four stands of the BSA were open to fans: “C” and “A”, each accommodating 23,000 spectators. However, the majority of Spartak fans preferred stand “C”, as it was closer to the metro station. Therefore, only 3-4 thousand of the approximately 16 thousand spectators in the stadium were in the “A” stand during the match. Considering the small number of tickets sold, as well as the need to clear snow from the stands in a short time before the match, and the excess number of seats for fans in two open stands, the administration’s decision to use two of the four stands was considered justified by the investigation.
The situation in the stands, according to the testimony of witnesses questioned by the investigation, was quite tense: the stands did not have time to be completely cleared and there was still snow and ice in many places, and many fans, trying to warm up, took a significant amount of alcohol. They began to pelt the policemen en masse with snowballs and pieces of ice, trying to hit them on the head in order to knock off their caps. Sometimes bottles were thrown at the policemen. During the match, 150 hooligans were taken to police rooms, but this only provoked other fans.
A few minutes before the end of the match, many fans headed for the exit. The case materials confirmed that all exits from both working stands were open, about which the fans themselves wrote to newspapers years later. But the bulk of the spectators from the “C” stand moved along Staircase No. 1. Since people were cold, and many were lightly dressed, everyone wanted to quickly get to the metro; A stream of people tightly pressed against each other moved down this staircase.
According to eyewitnesses, a girl fell on the last steps of the stairs. Those in front stopped and tried to help her get up, but the people behind were pressing and those who tried to help were immediately crushed by the stream, felled and trampled. Others continued to trip over them, and the mountain of bodies grew.
When the collapse occurred, the crowd pressure became so great that the metal railings of the stairs buckled under the pressure of human bodies and people began to fall down onto the concrete floor. This saved some people from death, and some were crushed under the pile of falling bodies.
According to the investigation, Shvetsov’s goal did not aggravate the situation, but perhaps even alleviated it, since some of the spectators - who were just leaving the numerous “hatches” of the top floor of the stadium to the gallery to the stairs - rushed back and, thereby, weakened the pressure on already walking up the flight of stairs. Below, in a compressed mass of people, with a crush, it was absolutely impossible to turn around and, moreover, create a counter flow.
The investigation established that during the stampede there were only fans on the stairs, there were no police officers, as evidenced by the fact that there were no police officers among the dead. It was also established that the staircase where the collapse occurred was under a canopy and was completely dry. There was ice and snow on the stands, but not on the stairs where the tragedy occurred. There were also no facts that any of the BSA or police officers urged the fans to the exit. On the contrary, the investigation noted that the administration’s decision to continue the video broadcast on the stadium scoreboard, showing, after the final whistle, the teams leaving the field and a short cartoon, was able to keep some of the fans in the stands, which was confirmed by the survivors themselves.
After a thorough investigation (150 witnesses were questioned, the materials of the criminal case occupy 10 volumes), the Moscow prosecutor's office transferred the case to trial.
According to some publications, investigator A.L. Speer, in conversations with the defenders of the accused, admitted that the investigation did not find any compelling reasons to bring charges against their clients, but was forced to do this in order to “calm public opinion.” For the same reason, according to these publications, and to prevent the possibility of lynching by Spartak fans, V. A. Kokryshev and Yu. L. Panchikhin were taken into custody during the investigation.
Memorials and remembrance
On October 22, 1992, on the tenth anniversary of the tragedy, a monument “To those who died in the stadiums of the world” was erected near the western stands of Luzhniki.
On March 20, 2007, the NTV television company showed the documentary film “Fatal Goal” from the series “Victory of Death”, which tells about the tragedy at Luzhniki.
On October 20, 2007, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the tragedy, a match was held in Luzhniki in memory of the victims between veterans of Moscow Spartak and Dutch Haarlem.
In October 2007, the only book about this tragedy was published in Holland - “Drama in het Lenin-stadion”.
For the twenty-fifth anniversary of the tragedy, Andrei Aleksin, Sergei Fisun and Anton Khabibulin recorded a song called “The Twentieth Number”.
In 2008, the ESPN Classic channel showed the documentary film “Russian Night, the hidden football disaster” in Europe.
Since 1982, foreign media have periodically discussed information about an explosion allegedly committed by American intelligence agencies on a Soviet gas pipeline in Siberia. Western journalists are persistently trying to prove the theft of foreign technology that was installed on the exploded pipe.
Phantom Explosion
American military expert Thomas Reed and American political scientist Peter Schweitzer in the book “Above the Abyss. The history of the Cold War, told by its participant” claims that in 1982 in the USSR, a powerful explosion occurred on the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk gas pipeline, which was the result of a CIA operation prepared on the basis of information provided by KGB agent Vladimir Vetrov. In particular, the book says that the plan to organize economic sabotage against the Soviet Union through the secret transfer of technology with hidden defects was approved by President Ronald Reagan himself. However, Russian sources deny the fact of technology transfer, as well as the accident itself.
Nevertheless, the Americans not only claim that there was an explosion, but also call it a man-made disaster and “the largest CIA sabotage on the territory of the USSR.” Information about what happened appeared in various open sources in the West almost immediately after the incident, and its essence boiled down to the fact that it was the most powerful non-nuclear explosion, the power of which corresponded to 3 kilotons. The flash was recorded by American reconnaissance satellites, and at first it was mistaken for a nuclear explosion. However, the absence of an electromagnetic pulse that accompanies such explosions changed the conclusions of experts. Soon, according to publications, the White House received clarifications from the CIA director, who reported: “Everything is fine, the explosion is our job.”
American sabotage
Richard Clarke and Robert Knake, authors of World War III: What Will It Be Like? express their views on the events described. In their opinion, the situation was as follows. In the early 1980s. The Soviet leadership set foreign intelligence the task of obtaining a number of new technologies from the West, which was quite successfully accomplished.
Soon, the CIA, having analyzed the scientific and technical achievements of the USSR, came to the conclusion that they were mostly copies of Western technical innovations. In response, the US government imposed severe restrictions on the export of computers and software to the Soviet Union. However, the achievements of Western scientific thought still continued to seep into the USSR.
In July 1981, at an economic forum in Ottawa, French President François Mitterrand shared with White House President Ronald Reagan information that French intelligence had recruited KGB agent Vladimir Vetrov, who was analyzing data collected by Directorate T (scientific and technical intelligence).
According to Mitterrand, by this time Vetrov, already working under the pseudonym Farewell, had handed over about 4 thousand secret documents to the French side, and also provided the names of “hundreds of Soviet agents and buyers” who stole or bought through dummies technologies prohibited for sale in the USSR.
The Americans received a complete picture of the industrial espionage of the USSR, but decided not to rush the situation, but to continue supplying Moscow with the latest products, but in their own interests. At this time, the USSR was actively building the Trans-Siberian pipeline to Europe. And, according to Richard Clarke and Robert Nake, the CIA slipped substandard automated control systems to one of the Soviet "purchasers" of equipment for the facility. Defective chips were installed in the computer units of these systems. They passed the control check, but with longer work they had to create an emergency situation. And so it happened, at first the program showed its best side, but the moment came when it gave the command to close the valve in one segment of the pipeline, and in another to release gas at full capacity. As a result, the pressure exceeded the permissible level, the welds failed, gas escaped and “the most powerful non-nuclear explosion in history” occurred.
Closer to reality
And yet there are many ambiguities in this story. In the USSR, nothing was reported about the accident either in 1982 or after. It is impossible to establish the exact date of this disaster. Retired KGB General Vasily Pchelintsev, who headed the state security structures in the Tyumen region, in an interview with the Trud newspaper in 2004, called the version of the explosion “complete nonsense.” But he added that in April 1982, not far from Tobolsk, there was an explosion of two lines of the Urengoy-Chelyabinsk gas pipeline, which was in no way connected with foreign intelligence services. It's all about the Russian "maybe". After an inspection by the competent authorities, it was revealed that along the 700-kilometer section of the gas pipeline, Neftegazstroy workers did not install a single “weight” - a massive concrete ring that presses the pipe to the ground and keeps it from floating in marshy soils.
As a result, when the spring thaw began, pipes in wetlands floated to the surface and one of them cracked. The jet that burst out was so powerful that it pierced the pipe of a parallel gas pipeline. The explosion occurred in the morning; it was observed by planes flying over the southern Urals, and could well have been recorded by American spy satellites.
Many domestic experts put forward convincing arguments refuting the American version. First, in the 1980s, fully automated systems were rare, even in the United States. Secondly, after the illegal acquisition of imported technology, its installation at such an important strategic facility without thorough inspection and testing was impossible.
Confused
Doctor of Technical Sciences and explosives expert Vladimir Zakhmatov categorically denies not only the fact of an explosion on a gas pipeline in 1982, but also the possibility of sabotage. He notes that explosions, of course, occurred at different times, but they were explained by the difficult conditions of laying pipes in swampy areas. According to Zakhmatov, there were plenty of such accidents in both the USA and Canada.
Many experts say that the facts cited by Thomas Reed are more reminiscent of the events of 1989, when the Western Siberia-Urals-Volga region gas pipeline exploded in Bashkiria. Then, according to official data, 575 people died: all of them were on trains passing at that moment in the gas release zone. The commission found that the leak was possible due to damage caused to the gas pipe by an excavator bucket four years before the tragedy.
It is quite possible that the legend that spread in the West about the CIA sabotage of a Soviet gas pipeline was part of an information war that had been waged in many foreign media for decades.
As for Vetrov, he was convicted in 1982 by Soviet law enforcement agencies for the premeditated murder of a KGB officer and sent to serve his sentence in Irkutsk. He was later transferred to Lefortovo prison in Moscow, where, after being accused of treason in the form of espionage, he was executed.
According to Eastern beliefs, the character of people and their relationships with others are influenced by the year in which they were born. Currently, astrology has already taken over half the world and many people find great similarities with themselves or with others.
1982 who? - Year of the Black Water Dog. Those born between January 21, 1982 and February 12, 1983 fall under the influence of this sign.
Basic qualities
A dog is a sign of constant search. People born in 1982 try to take advantage of all their chances until their old age, but they fail. They are often disappointed by their successes or by their inability to realize their potential as they perceive it to be. They are essentially perfectionists who constantly try to achieve the best results, even if, according to others, everything has been done perfectly. Restless natures.
Nevertheless, these people are very reliable in life, they will never betray and are crystal decent. They are honest and faithful partners and friends.
Peculiarities
People born in 1982 go through life towards a clearly defined goal. They don't do anything rash. Their life path is subject to a precise plan, although when they achieve their goal they are not always happy. They are not always able to maintain good relationships with their loved ones. Despite the fact that the dog is a faithful and devoted creature, it does not show its emotions very strongly, is laconic and reserved. Stubbornness is one of the strongest qualities of this sign.
Social environment
The year 1982 also left its mark on their behavior in the social environment. People of the year of the Black Water Dog are not very sociable. But, if you manage to get close to these people, you will get loyal and devoted friends.
In disputes, they are very principled, and their powers of observation allow them to clearly and firmly defend their position to the end, citing the smallest details as arguments. They are not cynical, as it might seem at first glance, they are simply very scrupulous in everything.
If they avoid disputes, then in all other life situations they are hardworking, balanced, and loyal.
For those born in 1982, astrologers strongly recommend:
- do not look for unnecessary problems, especially far-fetched ones,
- do not take on other people’s worries and problems,
- lower your internal bar a little so as not to constantly try to improve your own achievements,
- enjoy the little things, because human happiness consists of small joys,
- take the attention of others.
Negative character traits
Your partner is a dog, get ready for the fact that he is often dissatisfied in life. This makes his character tough and uncompromising. Although he criticizes himself, he takes criticism from loved ones painfully, because in his soul he strives for perfection in everything. Sometimes, due to their inability to compromise, such people are straightforward, and sometimes they are simply tactless. Failures are experienced very painfully and their reaction to this is harsh and rude.
A dog cannot cope during such periods without the help of its loved ones, because it only lets you close to it. Support, help correctly distribute their potential and determine priorities. Become a wise and reliable friend to them. They will reward you for this with affection and loyalty.
In 1982, many famous people were born who gave the world their creations: Adam Lambert, world champion Evgeni Plushenko, Kate Middleton, Eddie Redmayne, fashion model Natalya Vodianova, Kirsten Dants and this is not a complete list.
30 years ago, a string of deaths of top state leaders dramatically changed the fate of the country
There was not a word in the newspapers about the real circumstances of the sudden death of the first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR, member of the CPSU Central Committee and army general Semyon Kuzmich Tsvigun. But someone found out exactly how Semyon Kuzmich passed away, and the rumor that one of Brezhnev’s most trusted people shot himself in the forehead quickly spread throughout Moscow.
The death of Tsvigun was the first dramatic event of 1982. Following Tsvigun, the second person in the party unexpectedly dies - member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Mikhail Andreevich Suslov. And this decisive year in the history of the Soviet Union will end with the death of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev himself. He will be replaced in the chair of the country's owner by Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, and a new era will begin.
Of course, at the beginning of the year no one could have foreseen such a development of events. But the death of the first deputy chairman of the KGB left a dark imprint on everything that happened in the country. And immediately there was talk that not everything was so simple - General Tsvigun did not die a natural death...
DEATH OF GENERAL TSVIGUN
The surest proof that Tsvigun passed away in an unusual way was the absence of Brezhnev’s signature on the obituary. Everyone decided that there was something political behind Tsvigun’s death. Moreover, just a few days later Suslov died. Are their deaths related? Did something secret happen in the country that cost the lives of both?
People who were more knowledgeable about the morals of Moscow at that time came to the conclusion that Tsvigun was at the center of a scandal surrounding the daughter of General Secretary Galina Brezhneva. There was talk that it was Tsvigun who ordered the arrest of Boris Ivanovich Buryatse, an intimate friend of Galina Leonidovna. Boris Buryatse was called a “gypsy” because he sang at the Romen Theater (in reality he was a Moldovan). After meeting Galina Leonidovna Buryatse became a soloist of the Bolshoi Theater, led an enviably cheerful lifestyle, drove a Mercedes...
Shortly before all these mysterious deaths, on December 30, 1981, a high-profile robbery occurred in Moscow. Unknown people stole a collection of diamonds from the famous lion trainer, People's Artist of the USSR, Hero of Socialist Labor Irina Bugrimova. They said that Boris Buryatse was among the suspects. He was arrested, but he seemed to have managed to ask Galina for help. And the investigation into the case of stolen diamonds and other scams in which Brezhneva’s name appeared was believed to be supervised by General Tsvigun. And when it became clear to him that all the threads led to the Brezhnev family, Tsvigun, they said, collected materials about the dubious connections of the daughter of the General Secretary and went to the Central Committee of the CPSU, to Suslov. Semyon Kuzmich laid out the results of the investigative team’s work on the table and asked permission to interrogate Galina.
Mikhail Andreevich, they said, flew into a rage and literally kicked Tsvigun out of his office, forbidding him to interrogate the secretary general’s daughter. The general came home and shot himself. And Suslov became so nervous that he had a stroke. He was taken from the Central Committee to a special hospital in an unconscious state, where he soon died...
Then, when Galina Brezhneva’s husband, former First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov, was arrested and convicted, talk that the General Secretary’s family was mired in corruption was confirmed.
ANDROPOV AND HIS DEPUTIES
Semyon Kuzmich Tsvigun was eleven years younger than Brezhnev. He graduated from the Odessa Pedagogical Institute, worked as a teacher, school director, and from the fall of 1939 served in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. In 1946, he was appointed to the Ministry of State Security of Moldova, where he met Leonid Ilyich when he worked as first secretary of the Republican Central Committee from 1950 to 1952. Brezhnev developed a sympathy for Semyon Kuzmich, which he retained until the end of his life.
Leonid Ilyich did not forget his old acquaintances and helped them. In general, he had an enviable gift for maintaining good relations with the right people, and they served him faithfully. Brezhnev attached particular importance to state security personnel, and he himself selected trusted people there. In this Brezhnev cohort, the leading role was played by two generals - Semyon Kuzmich Tsvigun and Georgy Karpovich Tsinev.
Before the war, Tsinev was the head of the department, and then the secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk city committee. His boss turned out to be the secretary of the regional committee, Brezhnev. In '41, both joined the army. After the war, Brezhnev returned to party work. Tsinev was left in the ranks of the Armed Forces, and in 1953, after the state security organs were purged of Beria’s people, he was transferred to the Lubyanka. When Brezhnev became the first secretary of the Central Committee, Tsinev headed the third department of the KGB - military counterintelligence agencies.
By the time Brezhnev was elected head of the party, Tsvigun and Tsinev had already worked in the KGB for a long time. But their relationship with the then chairman of the committee, Vladimir Efimovich Semichastny, did not work out. Brezhnev replaced Semichastny with Andropov. And he immediately asked to return Tsvigun from Azerbaijan. Yuri Vladimirovich understood Brezhnev perfectly. Three days later, Semyon Kuzmich became deputy chairman of the KGB. A day later, Tsinev was confirmed as a member of the KGB board. In 1970 he would become deputy chairman.
Tsvigun and Tsinev accompanied Andropov everywhere, unceremoniously settling down in his office to be present at the important conversation. So Leonid Ilyich knew every step of the KGB chairman.
GENERAL'S LOVE FOR CINEMA
Tsvigun and Tsinev received the rank of army general, like Andropov, although they were supposed to be one step below the commander in the military hierarchy. Brezhnev gave both of them the Gold Star of the Hero of Socialist Labor. At the same time, Tsvigun and Tsinev did not get along with each other. This also suited Leonid Ilyich.
Having become the first deputy, Tsinev shouted at the generals. Many in the committee hated Georgy Karpovich. Without hesitation, he ruined people's destinies.
Benevolent in character, Tsvigun did not particularly offend anyone, so he left a good memory of himself. Semyon Kuzmich became interested in literary creativity. I started with documentary books about the machinations of the imperialists. And soon novels and film scripts began to appear under the transparent pseudonym S. Dneprov. Informed people know the names of professional writers who “helped” Tsvigun.
Semyon Kuzmich's scripts were quickly turned into feature films. Their main character, whom Tsvigun wrote from himself, was played by Vyacheslav Tikhonov. Semyon Kuzmich did not look like a popular artist, an idol of those years, but he probably saw himself like that in his dreams. Tsvigun (under the pseudonym “Colonel General S.K. Mishin”) was also the main military consultant for the famous film “Seventeen Moments of Spring.”
Brezhnev was not embarrassed by Tsvigun’s passion for the fine arts. He was condescending towards the petty human weaknesses of devoted people. And for Tsvigun and for Tsinev, the main criterion for assessing people was loyalty and fidelity to Leonid Ilyich.
BIG EAR COMMITTEE
Georgy Karpovich Tsinev controlled the ninth directorate of the KGB (politburo security) and, as they say, was in charge of bugging senior government officials. He also looked after the “politically unreliable” - not dissidents, but those officials who were suspected of insufficient loyalty to the Secretary General.
Tsvigun was one of the most devoted people to Leonid Ilyich. Never in his life would he do anything that could harm him. It is now known that no case of Galina Brezhneva existed. But she did know some people who came to the attention of law enforcement agencies.
The head of the main department of internal affairs of the capital was then Vasily Petrovich Trushin, a native of the Komsomol. “We once detained a speculator,” said General Trushin, “through her we got to a gypsy from the Bolshoi Theater, who supplied her with goods. From the gypsy, traces led to Galina Brezhneva.”
“Gypsy” is the already mentioned Boris Buryatse. But he was not imprisoned for stealing diamonds. In 1982, he was sentenced to seven years in prison under Article 154, Part 2 (speculation) of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. He will serve four years and will be released at the end of 1986.
Having learned about the arrest of Boris Buryatse, Minister of Internal Affairs Nikolai Anisimovich Shchelokov, a man loyal to Brezhnev, was frightened. Trushin scolded:
- Do you understand what you're up to? How could you?
Shchelokov called Andropov - he wanted to consult. But the KGB chairman replied that such issues should be resolved with Leonid Ilyich. Shchelokov said displeasedly to Trushin:
- Resolve issues about Galina with her husband, do not involve me in this matter.
Galina's husband was Colonel General Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Trushin reported to Churbanov that the investigation needed Galina’s testimony. The next morning, Yuri Mikhailovich sent him a statement, signed by Galina Leonidovna, stating that she did not know Buryatse and had no business with him.
It was not state security that dealt with the history of Buryat, but the police. It never occurred to anyone in the KGB leadership to investigate the activities of the daughter of the general secretary. Semyon Kuzmich Tsvigun had nothing to do with this at all. So there was no need for him to go to Suslov with mythical documents, nor to put a bullet in his forehead because of Galina Leonidovna.
But the versions are endless... They whispered that Semyon Kuzmich was removed so that he would not interfere with the conspiracy against Brezhnev. And the conspiracy was allegedly organized by Suslov, who decided to take power.
POLITIBURO MEMBER IN GALOSHE
There are also a lot of rumors, versions, myths and legends around Suslov. He was a complex person, with secret complexes, very secretive. There are writers who believe that it was Stalin who wanted to proclaim him his heir, but did not have time.
Of all the versions, this is the funniest. Stalin, firstly, had no intention of dying at all, and secondly, he treated his henchmen with disgust and contempt and could not imagine any of them in his place.
Mikhail Andreevich Suslov was born in November 1902 in the village of Shakhovskaya, Khvalynsky district, Saratov province. As a child, he suffered from tuberculosis and was mortally afraid of the disease returning. That’s why I always wrapped myself up and wore galoshes. The only one in Brezhnev’s circle, he did not go hunting - he was afraid of catching a cold.
Historians often wonder why Mikhail Andreevich Suslov, who sat in the chair of the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for thirty-five years, setting an absolute record, did not become the head of the party and state? The role of the leader of the country requires the ability to make extraordinary and independent decisions, without looking at the calendar. Khrushchev could do it. Brezhnev - until he started getting sick. And Mikhail Andreevich was accustomed to strictly following the canons. He did not allow either others or himself any liberties or deviations from the general line. The thin-lipped secretary of the Central Committee with the face of an inquisitor remembered all ideological formulations by heart and was pathologically afraid of the living word, afraid of change. I was always interested in how this or that issue was resolved in the past. If the word “for the first time” was heard, Suslov thought about it and postponed the decision.
Other members of the Politburo were often mocked; Suslov did not give rise to jokes. The only thing that made him smile was his passion for galoshes and old-cut suits. His daughter Maya said that her father sternly reprimanded her when she put on a then fashionable trouser suit, and did not allow her to sit at the table like that.
Mikhail Andreevich’s habit of driving at a speed of almost forty kilometers per hour was also amazing. No one dared to overtake his car. The first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee, Vasily Sergeevich Tolstikov, said in such cases:
“Today you will overtake, tomorrow you will overtake, and the day after tomorrow there will be nothing to overtake.”
At Politburo meetings, Suslov sat to the right of the General Secretary. But he didn’t push himself, he invariably repeated: “That’s what Leonid Ilyich decided.” Brezhnev knew that he did not need to be afraid of Suslov: he would not bother him. Mikhail Andreevich was quite happy with the position of the second person.
Suslov spoke briefly and only to the point. No jokes, no extraneous conversations. He addressed everyone by their last name, except, of course, Brezhnev. The operators admired him. But it is impossible to forget what Suslov did to the country. He was the main conductor of a total mind-processing that lasted for decades and created an incredibly distorted picture of the world. The Brezhnev-Suslov system reinforced the habit of hypocrisy and pharisaism - such as stormy and prolonged applause at meetings, enthusiastic greetings of leaders - any leaders.
How would Mikhail Andreevich react to a visitor who spoke to him about troubles in the family of the General Secretary? According to the unwritten rules of party ethics, the KGB chairman discussed all problems related to the family of the general secretary with him one on one - and only if he had enough determination. The highly experienced Mikhail Andreevich would certainly not have gotten involved in the personal affairs of the Secretary General. And no one would dare come to him with such matters.
"YOU WANT TO MAKE ME SICK"
So what happened to General Tsvigun on that January day in 1982?
Semyon Kuzmich had been seriously ill for a long time; he was diagnosed with lung cancer. At first, doctors' forecasts were optimistic. The operation was successful. It seemed that the patient was saved, but, alas, the cancer cells spread throughout the body, his condition deteriorated literally before our eyes. Metastases went to the brain, Tsvigun began to talk.
In a moment of enlightenment, he made a courageous decision to end his suffering. Semyon Kuzmich shot himself in the holiday village of Usovo on January 19, 1982. That day Tsvigun felt better, called a car and went to the dacha. There they drank a little with the driver, who served as a security guard, then went out for a walk, and Semyon Kuzmich unexpectedly asked if his personal weapon was in order. He nodded in surprise.
“Show me,” Tsvigun ordered.
The driver pulled the weapon out of his holster and handed it to the general. Semyon Kuzmich took the pistol, took the safety off, put a cartridge into the chamber, put the pistol to his temple and fired. This happened at a quarter to five.
Brezhnev was shocked by the death of his old comrade. I was very worried, but did not sign the obituary of the suicide, just as priests refuse to perform funeral services for suicides.
What happened to Mikhail Andreevich Suslov?
Suslov complained to his attending physician of pain in his left arm and behind his chest after even a short walk. Experienced doctors immediately determined that the pain was of a cardiac nature—Mikhail Andreevich had developed severe angina. We conducted research and established atherosclerosis of the heart vessels and coronary insufficiency. But Suslov categorically rejected the diagnosis:
- You're making it all up. I'm not sick. It's you who want to make me sick. I am healthy, but my joint is aching.
Maybe he didn’t want to consider himself sick so that he wouldn’t be forced to retire, maybe he didn’t sincerely believe that he was capable of getting sick like other people. Then the doctors cheated: they ordered an ointment containing heart medications in the United States. And Mikhail Andreevich was told that it would relieve joint pain.
Suslov carefully rubbed the ointment into his sore hand. The medicine helped. Heart pain has decreased. Mikhail Andreevich was pleased and edifyingly remarked to the doctors:
“I told you my arm hurts.” They started using the ointment, and everything went away. And you kept telling me: heart, heart...
In January 1982, the second person in the party went for examination. Initially, doctors did not find anything frightening about him. And then he had a stroke right in the hospital, he lost consciousness and never came to his senses. The brain hemorrhage was so extensive that it left no hope.
AN UNEXPECTED GUEST FROM UKRAINE
Having lost reliable support, Brezhnev looked for a replacement for Suslov. It seems that he chose Andropov and told Yuri Vladimirovich that he would return him from the KGB to the Central Committee. But month after month passed, and Brezhnev hesitated to make a decision. Did you hesitate? Have you been looking at someone else for the role of second person in the party?
At this time, a secret conversation took place between Brezhnev and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Shcherbitsky, about personnel matters. Andropov became alarmed, realizing what could be behind this. Shcherbitsky was one of Brezhnev's favorites.
Only four months after Suslov's death, on May 24, 1982, Andropov was finally elected secretary of the Central Committee. And unexpectedly for everyone, Vitaly Vasilyevich Fedorchuk, who was transferred from Kyiv, became the chairman of the KGB of the USSR - he was in charge of state security in Ukraine. Fedorchuk's appointment was unpleasant to Andropov. He wanted to leave another person in his place at Lubyanka. But he didn’t dare object.
Vitaly Vasilyevich worked in Kyiv for twelve years. In 1970, he was just as unexpectedly appointed chairman of the KGB of Ukraine. This was not an ordinary change of leadership of the Republican State Security Committee, but a political action.
When Brezhnev became General Secretary, Ukraine was led by Pyotr Efimovich Shelest. And Leonid Ilyich had his own candidate for this post. Vladimir Vasilyevich Shcherbitsky began his party career in the homeland of Leonid Ilyich, in Dneprodzerzhinsk. But besides personal ones, Brezhnev had other motives.
In Moscow, Shelest was suspected of patronizing nationalists. Pyotr Efimovich, perhaps, loved Ukraine and the Ukrainian language more than other Kyiv politicians. He relied on the sentiments of a considerable part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, who spoke with bitterness about the fate of their people. And Shcherbitsky, as he himself said, stood on the “positions of Bogdan Khmelnitsky,” that is, he was completely oriented toward Moscow. He spoke at plenums and meetings in Russian. He made sure that Moscow liked everything he did.
After Fedorchuk moved to Kyiv, a wave of arrests of dissidents, real and imaginary, took place across Ukraine. After perestroika, many of them will become prominent cultural figures and deputies of the Ukrainian parliament. As they used to say in Ukraine back then: “When nails are cut in Moscow, hands are cut in Kyiv.” The “criminal shortcomings” revealed by Fedorchuk in the field of ideology helped Brezhnev vacate the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine for his friend. He deftly removed Shelest. Shcherbitsky became the owner of the republic.
People in the know claim: after Suslov’s death, Leonid Ilyich reassured his Kyiv friend: “Andropov will not become my successor, after me, Volodya, you will be the general secretary.”
SUCCESSORS AT THE FOOT OF THE THRONE
Brezhnev made a choice in favor of Fedorchuk, whom he himself did not know, on the advice of General Tsinev. Due to his age and health, Georgy Karpovich himself could not head the State Security Committee. But Fedorchuk’s appointment could be a more significant step than it seemed from the outside. Once he ensured the transfer of power in Ukraine into the hands of Shcherbitsky. Maybe now he had to fulfill the same mission in Moscow?
The former secretary of the Central Committee for personnel, Ivan Vasilyevich Kapitonov, assured that in mid-October 1982 Leonid Ilyich summoned him.
- Do you see this chair? - Brezhnev asked, pointing to his. - Shcherbitsky will sit in it. Solve all personnel issues with this in mind...
Having become chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Fedorchuk continued to look back at the Ukrainian leadership. I called back with Shcherbitsky, listened to his advice and requests. The apparatus noted the increased activity of Shcherbitsky. Andropov saw this. Yuri Vladimirovich knew how much in personnel matters depended on the KGB.
But Fedorchuk practically did not communicate with Andropov. Yuri Vladimirovich was wary of his replacement. He knew that new people were in charge of government communications, and he suspected that the security officers were now tapping his phones too.
Yuri Vladimirovich knew what advances were made to Shcherbitsky, and this made him additionally nervous. Who else could lay claim to the general's position? Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, permanent head of the general department of the Central Committee?
In recent years, Brezhnev trusted Chernenko so much that, as they say, he signed the papers he brought without delving into their essence. There were rumors in the Central Committee that in one of his conversations with Chernenko, Brezhnev confidentially told him:
- Kostya, get ready to accept business from me.
In reality, Leonid Ilyich had no intention of leaving at all. And like any normal person, he didn’t think about imminent death, so no one took his conversations regarding a successor seriously. It was more of a trial balloon. He wanted to see who would support the pension idea. But in the Politburo, the people were experienced, seasoned, no one made a mistake... In his circle, it was beneficial for everyone that he remained in his post as long as possible, although those who had the opportunity to see him up close understood how bad he was.
The country and the world wondered what the new leader of the country would bring with him, what ideas he would put forward. And few people understood that the main office on Old Square was occupied by a seriously ill man, whose earthly time was already expiring...
As we see, there was nothing mysterious in the death of General Tsvigun, Mikhail Andreevich Suslov, and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev himself in 1982. For that matter, the main mystery is how all these people of very modest capabilities and abilities, a huge layer of officials - illiterate dogmatists or extreme cynics - ended up at the head of our state. And naturally they brought it to its decline.
"God's" hand of Maradona
The Soviet people received with deep satisfaction the results of the May Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, at which the food program was adopted. Alas, the solid document did not add either food or optimism: “sausage” trains, as before, departed from Moscow, grocery stores were subjected to increasingly massive attacks by citizens and guests of the capital.
On the other side of the planet, British possessions were attacked: Argentine troops landed on the Falkland Islands, forcing the local garrison to capitulate. Both sides began to beat each other mercilessly, but the advantage of the British was not in doubt. Soon, Her Majesty's assault troops hoisted the British banner over the capital of Falkland, Port Stanley.
The Argentines, who failed to prove their strength on the battlefield, took revenge on the football field - they beat the British in the quarterfinals of the 1982 FIFA World Cup. True, Maradona shamelessly scored the decisive goal with the hand he called “God’s”...
Let's return to our homeland, where life gives Soviet people small but pleasant surprises. This time it came in the form of Adidas sneakers, which the Sport plant began producing under license. Truly, in order to grab a box of coveted shoes, one had to have solid physical strength and remarkable patience! After all, the queues for sneakers were stunning!
...On the evening of November 10, the broadcast of a hockey match was suddenly canceled, and the next morning the country heard the poignant melody of a requiem, which preceded the announcement of the death of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Brezhnev...
Valery Burt
—1945. Stirlitz was approaching Berlin. The city was in smoke and flames. “Damn...,” Stirlitz was annoyed. He forgot to turn off the iron again.” ... 1945. Stirlitz was approaching Berlin. The city was in smoke and flames. “Damn...,” Stirlitz was annoyed. He forgot to turn off the iron again.”
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—Three girls called the Queen of Spades. They poured water into a glass and put a mirror. They pulled out a mirror and said: “Appear, Queen of Spades!” In twelve... Three girls called the Queen of Spades. They poured water into a glass and put a mirror. They pulled out a mirror and said: “Appear, Queen of Spades!” At twelve o'clock at night the girls hear creaking and footsteps. A girl who was in first grade came out to watch. She was gone for a long time. Another one, who was in the preparatory group, also ran to look. She was also gone for a long time. And the other one, who was in the older group, got scared and crawled under the bed. In the morning my mother came and saw that the second girl was lying in the bathroom. She had three black spots on her neck. But the first one was not found. Three days later they found that girl in the basement. She was already dead. She also had three black spots on her neck. The girls called the Queen of Spades. And if the water starts to swirl, it will appear. And she began to flounder. She appeared. To make it disappear, you need to throw a mirror on the floor. But they didn’t know this.
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